Many of the stories about the soldiers from Quorn are short due to the horrifically dangerous nature of the situations they were put in. Archibald’s story is one of those from the other end of the spectrum. He was the longest serving of the Quorn soldiers from this group of forty. He managed to survive the war, but not the army, for a total of 47 months enlistment.
Archibald Jago was born near Carrieton. Prior to enlistment in April 1915 he was a grazier and was also a member of the Yanyarrie Rifle Club for two years.
A month later he embarked from Adelaide on the HMAT Afric as part of the 4th Light Horse Brigade Train as a driver.
Archibald has no entries in his military record for the period between June 1915 and March 1916. Other soldiers records from the same unit indicate that the Brigade Train was at Gallipoli during this time, traveling there on the “Inkosi” from Alexandria in September and some of them leaving during the evacuation in December.
1916
On the 20th March Archibald embarked from Alexandria for Marseilles where he stepped onto French soil eight days later. A month later he was attached temporarily to the 20th Battalion. On the 21st of June Archibald rejoined his normal unit [the records are a little unclear, they refer to the 20th Corps or it could be the 4th Light Horse Baggage Train].
A little over a week later Archibald was admitted to hospital in La Nouvelle. Initial records noted he had influenza but three days later he was transferred to the 3rd Stationary Canadian Hospital in Bolougne where his condition was noted as PUO [Pyaemia of Unknown Origins].
A day later on the 3rd of July he was loaded aboard the HS “Jan Breydel” and shipped to England. Later that same day he was admitted to Graylingwell War Hospital in Bristol.
At the end of July Archibald seems to have been convalescing with a change of units in mind. On the 21st of the month his regimental number was changed from 5988 to 8894 as he left the Light Horse unit he had been with and on the 1st August he was taken on strength by the Australian Army Service Corps Training Depot in Perham Downs.
1917
Toward the end of January 1917 Archibald was again sick enough to be admitted to hospital. This time it was the Brigade Hospital for the Service Corps at Parkhouse.
On 12 February he was discharged from the hospital back to the Training Depot. After a further month in the training depot he was transferred to the 30th Australian Service Corps.
For the rest of the year Archibald moved around England as part of the Service Corps, including Weymouth, Tidworth, Fovant and Westham. He also spent a further six days in the Monte Video Hospital at Weymouth during October.
1918
In April 1918 Archibald was tried for the offence of breaking out of camp and given four days of Field Punishment Number 2. Shortly after this he was sent back to the Training Depot at Parkhouse, then a further month later he was sent back toFrance.
On the 8th May 1918, Archibald was in Le Havre and on the 13th he was marched out to join the 2nd Divisional Train.
At the end of June Archibald was temporarily detached to the 12th Battery, 16th Company AASC. This also happened for a short period at the end of September and end of November as well.
By this time the war had ended and Archibald spent the remainder of 1918 with the 20th Company AASC.
1919
Archibald must have been relieved to have survived the war and in January 1919 he was transferred to the AGBD at Le Havre in preparation for his return to Australia. On the 15th he returned to England and marched into Sutton Veny. Once again Archibald was admitted to hospital. This time his diagnosis was “bronchopneumonia” and he was noted as dangerously ill. On the 9th February Archibald succumbed to his disease. He was buried at the local church, St John the Evangelist, four days later.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
The Story of William Charles Pinnegar Brown

William enlisted at Quorn in May of 1916 at that time his wife (Ester Ethel) was also living in Quorn, though she later moved to Parkside in Adelaide. William was born in Adelaide and was 30 years old. He had fair hair and skin as well as blue eyes and was working as a carpenter in Quorn. When he was younger he had done his five year apprenticeship in Unley.
William embarked on the HMAT Anchises on the 28th of August 1916 as part of the 20th reinforcements for the 10th Battalion. Fourteen days later he disembarked at Plymouth and a day later marched into the 3rd Training Battalion at Perham Downs.
He was in England for only two months and then traveled to France on board the “Golden Eagle” to enter Etaples one week before Christmas 1916.
On the first day of the new year William was taken on strength as part of 27 Battalion.
No other information is recorded about William until his death on 5 May. This was the same day that Miller Fergusson was also killed. The war diary entry for the first days of May are included in Miller’s story.
William left his wife and two daughters, Margaret and Olive.
William embarked on the HMAT Anchises on the 28th of August 1916 as part of the 20th reinforcements for the 10th Battalion. Fourteen days later he disembarked at Plymouth and a day later marched into the 3rd Training Battalion at Perham Downs.
He was in England for only two months and then traveled to France on board the “Golden Eagle” to enter Etaples one week before Christmas 1916.
On the first day of the new year William was taken on strength as part of 27 Battalion.
No other information is recorded about William until his death on 5 May. This was the same day that Miller Fergusson was also killed. The war diary entry for the first days of May are included in Miller’s story.
William left his wife and two daughters, Margaret and Olive.
William is thought to be buried in Queant Road Cemetery, but his actual grave is unknown and his name appears on a special memorial. The cemetery is near Buissy which was not reached by the allies until early September 1918. The cemetery was used by allied clearing stations in October and November. After the war Queant Road Cemetery was used to bring in graves from the surrounding areas. There are now almost 2400 Commonwealth soldiers buried or commemorated in this cemetery, 1,400 of the burials are unidentified. There are special memorials to 56 soldiers known or believed to be buried there, including William.
Monday, June 09, 2008
Holiday Monday at Brighton
The rain fell in a consistant drizzle last night and the air is not very warm, but a spectacular sea and cloud scape from the Brighton Jetty.
Sunday, June 01, 2008
Training at Port Pirie
The Motor Falke, ready to be rolled out for another days training at Port Pirie. Thankfully the weather was wonderful. Unlike this time last year at Kadina.
Sunday, May 25, 2008
The Story of John Francis Watson.
John Watson was born in Quorn and was 21 years old at the time of his enlistment in early march 1916. John had been a labourer and he enlisted at Port Pirie. He was taken on strength in the Second Reinforcements to the 5th Pioneer Battalion and promptly sent overseas on the HMAT Aeneas. The ship left Adelaide on 11th of April 1916.Eighteen days later John was admitted to the ships hospital with measles, from which he died, three hours later.
John was taken off the ship and buried in Colombo Cemetery in Ceylon, today known as Sri Lanka.
-------------------ooOOoo-------------------
John Watson was the last of the Quorn soldiers who I have managed to identify. It has taken some months of research but by lucky accident I discovered a reference to him in the South Australian State Archives. He has been difficult to track down as his initials on the Quorn monument were wrongly given as “R. J.”. There is also little reference to his connections with Quorn in the minimal records that resulted from his extremely short service.
Friday, May 23, 2008
The Story of Roy James Gladstone Burr Pt 2
Since I wrote the original entry regarding Roy Burr the war diaries for the 52nd Battalion have come on line at the Australian War Museum Archives. The following is a transcript of the diary from the addendum to that Diary, including punctuation and spelling as close to the original as possible.
This extract describes the action from the 2nd to the 3rd, September 1916. Roy was almost certainly killed near Moquet Farm on or before the 3rd as the Australians were pulled out of action by the end of that day.
-------------------ooOOoo-------------------
Addendum:
…About 10.30 a.m. on the 2nd Brigade orders for attacking were received and Battalion Orders (appendix 1) we issued at 1 p.m., and at the same time personnaly gone through by C.O. with Company Commanders of “A” “C” and “D” Coys.
100 rounds – Bombs, and 2 sand-bags per man were issued on the 1st. and all arrangements for the ammunition, bombs, water, and ration supplies were completed during the morning of the 2nd. At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2nd Battalion Headquarters took up position at KAY’S DUMP and at about 4 p.m. Lieut-Colonel K.F.BEEVOR was wounded and command of Battalion devolved on Major D.A. LANE.
Companies commenced leaving LA BOISELLE at 7 p.m. and the last Company had cleared KAY’S DUMP at 9.30 p.m.
Provision had been made for guides for each Company, and tapes laid over open ground from BOX LANE to ASSEMBLE TRENCHES to avoid any loss of direction in the darkness. At 11.15 p.m. “C” Company were in position and in touch with “B” Company on their left. A message had previously been dispatched by O.C. “B” Company to leave men in Front Line to mark flanks of “D” “A” and “C” Companies but messenger failed to deliver same.
Thus from the outset communication with “B” Company was extremely difficult.
About 12.30 p.m. 2-3rd the Battalion Intelligence Officer (Lieut A.H.MAXWELL) was sent along the Companies to Synchronise watches for the second time, make sure that all were in their correct positions and assist Company Commanders with any information required as to their front and objective. At 3.51 a.m. on the 3rd of September BIO reported that all Companies were in position with their 1st wave in front trench and other waves (in some cases two and in others three) in ASSEMBLY TRENCHES.
From information gathered from various sources the Companies commenced their assault about NK 5.14 a.m. leaving their “Jumping Off” point very nearly at the same moment.
The assault was delivered with much spirit and dash and in cases a short, but fierce and bloody hand to hand conflict ensued. Bayonets and rifle butts coming into free play.
Each company siezed its objective and “C” Company evidently pushed forward under our own barrage. The Company Commander (Capt. EKIN-SMYTHE) drew them back towards the their objective but was unfortuneately about this time mortally wounded.
The Company again pressed forwardand as an organised unit ceased to exist.
At 7 a.m. our Scouts in observation posts observed the line shown by Contact Flares. They could only observe as far as the left of “A” Companies objective, and forwarded a sketch showing the Line extending from about 94 towards the Right. There was a break of about a hundred yards and then the Line again delineated extending to somewhere about 24.
At 7.29 a.m. a message was despatched to O.C. “D” Coy seeking information as to whether he was connected up with the 49th Battalion. It may here be mentioned that every Officer in “D” Coy became a casualty early in the battle and messages despatched to them were opened by Lieut D.S.MAXWELL of “A” Company.
At 7.50 a.m. the following message was received from Lieut D.S.MAXWELL “Have captured centre of “A” Companies’ Objective but failed to connect so far on left and right……… have barricaded on right and I am holding on, 8 prisoners I am holding as cannot afford a guard. 0615”.
Orders were immediately despatched to “C” and “D” Companies to work inwards and connect with “A” Company. These messages subsequently proved futile as both Companies had ceased to exist as tactical units.
At 8.57 a.m. a report timed 7.15 a.m. was received from “A” Company that he had gained touch with 49th Battalion on his right and that enemy were preparing to counter attack on his left. This information was sent on to Brigade and Artillery support obtained.
The position of Companies was obscure, as no reports had had been received from any Company other than “A”. A message was despatched to “A” Company at 9.22 a.m. asking point where his left rested and whether he was in touch with “C” Company.
At 9.49 a.m. a message timed 7.25 a.m. was received from “B” Company that two of his platoons were in MOQUET FARM and two platoons at, and mostly to the right of 42, but he was not certain whether 42 was actualy held.
It was not yet known that “C” Company was to all intents and purposes out of consideration, and it appeared that there was a gap between “A” and “C” Companies and probably between “C” and “B” companies. The exact position of “D” Company was also obscure.
At 12.3 noon a message timed 10.59 a.m. was received from”A” Company accompanied with a sketch which showed that the 49th Battalion were apparently at 36 and that trench 36 – 03 was unoccupied by us and apparently unoccupied by anybody.
Also it was clear that his left was not connected up. The situation of “D” Company was also perplexing, as the envelope of my message (D 90) was marked “Opened by me – “D” Company in our section” and initialled by Lieut. D.S. MAXWELL. He also gave the information that he and Lieut Blakney were the only 52nd Officers in that part of the trench. The questioning of messengers elicited the fact that very few of “D” Coy” were in the trench. A message was despatched to “A” Company endeavouring to clear this matter up.
About 1 o’clock the runner sent to “C” Company at 8.5 a.m. returned with the report that he could find nothing of “C” Company and that the Hostile Barrage prevented him approaching line 42-73. About mid day I was informed by the 51st Battn. That only about 30 men of the 52nd could be seen in the vicinity of point 42. Later in the afternoon 10 men from “B” Company reported at Battalion Headquarters and stated that they had come from somewhere near point 42 and had not seen any others of “B” Company by them.
The question of carriers for supplies had become acute, the parties detailled by Companies not being able to cope with the demand. The two bomb teams held in reserve were ordered to keep up the supply of bombs and fill vacancies in teams as required.
At 2.25 p.m. on their return from the Front Line, what remained of these teams were despatched to “A” Company for the purpose of occupying trench 03-36 and a message accompanied with a sketch sent to “A” Company that this trench be made good. The bombers arrived at “A” Company but the runner failed to deliver his despatch. At 3.30 p.m. Nos. 1 and 2 companies of the 13th canadian Battalion were placed under my command. No. 1 Company was directedto reinforce “A” Company, moving by SUNKEN ROAD 21-22-24.
The Battalion Intelligence Officer personnaly directed them to point 21 and the company reinforced the firing line at daylight with only 2 casualties. No. 2 Company was directed to occupy Line 21-01-91-59 and obtain touch with 50th Battalion on the left. The Battalion Intelligence Officer directed this company along its frontage and pointed out Communications Trenches 01-03 and 91-73. Orders were given for No. 2 Canadian Company to bomb up trench 91-73 put in a stop and place a Lewis Gun to protect Left Flank from direction of 49 and MOQUET FARM.
At 5.55 p.m. on Orders received from Brigade instructions were issued to No 1, Canadian Company to bomb to point 42 and along Communications Trenches running NORTH from 73 and 42 placeing stops in these later. This company reported that they eventually gained 73 and had put a stop about 60 yards down trench towards 01. Subsequent definitions of frontage, however, leads to the belief that it wa at 28-04 where they were held up and put up a barricade and possibly a stop was put on Trench 03-01.
…The next paragraph of the War Diary Appendix refers to 3.35 pm on the 4th and goes on to describe further action by the Canadian Reinforcements.
This extract describes the action from the 2nd to the 3rd, September 1916. Roy was almost certainly killed near Moquet Farm on or before the 3rd as the Australians were pulled out of action by the end of that day.
-------------------ooOOoo-------------------
Addendum:
…About 10.30 a.m. on the 2nd Brigade orders for attacking were received and Battalion Orders (appendix 1) we issued at 1 p.m., and at the same time personnaly gone through by C.O. with Company Commanders of “A” “C” and “D” Coys.
100 rounds – Bombs, and 2 sand-bags per man were issued on the 1st. and all arrangements for the ammunition, bombs, water, and ration supplies were completed during the morning of the 2nd. At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2nd Battalion Headquarters took up position at KAY’S DUMP and at about 4 p.m. Lieut-Colonel K.F.BEEVOR was wounded and command of Battalion devolved on Major D.A. LANE.
Companies commenced leaving LA BOISELLE at 7 p.m. and the last Company had cleared KAY’S DUMP at 9.30 p.m.
Provision had been made for guides for each Company, and tapes laid over open ground from BOX LANE to ASSEMBLE TRENCHES to avoid any loss of direction in the darkness. At 11.15 p.m. “C” Company were in position and in touch with “B” Company on their left. A message had previously been dispatched by O.C. “B” Company to leave men in Front Line to mark flanks of “D” “A” and “C” Companies but messenger failed to deliver same.
Thus from the outset communication with “B” Company was extremely difficult.
About 12.30 p.m. 2-3rd the Battalion Intelligence Officer (Lieut A.H.MAXWELL) was sent along the Companies to Synchronise watches for the second time, make sure that all were in their correct positions and assist Company Commanders with any information required as to their front and objective. At 3.51 a.m. on the 3rd of September BIO reported that all Companies were in position with their 1st wave in front trench and other waves (in some cases two and in others three) in ASSEMBLY TRENCHES.
From information gathered from various sources the Companies commenced their assault about NK 5.14 a.m. leaving their “Jumping Off” point very nearly at the same moment.
The assault was delivered with much spirit and dash and in cases a short, but fierce and bloody hand to hand conflict ensued. Bayonets and rifle butts coming into free play.
Each company siezed its objective and “C” Company evidently pushed forward under our own barrage. The Company Commander (Capt. EKIN-SMYTHE) drew them back towards the their objective but was unfortuneately about this time mortally wounded.
The Company again pressed forwardand as an organised unit ceased to exist.
At 7 a.m. our Scouts in observation posts observed the line shown by Contact Flares. They could only observe as far as the left of “A” Companies objective, and forwarded a sketch showing the Line extending from about 94 towards the Right. There was a break of about a hundred yards and then the Line again delineated extending to somewhere about 24.
At 7.29 a.m. a message was despatched to O.C. “D” Coy seeking information as to whether he was connected up with the 49th Battalion. It may here be mentioned that every Officer in “D” Coy became a casualty early in the battle and messages despatched to them were opened by Lieut D.S.MAXWELL of “A” Company.
At 7.50 a.m. the following message was received from Lieut D.S.MAXWELL “Have captured centre of “A” Companies’ Objective but failed to connect so far on left and right……… have barricaded on right and I am holding on, 8 prisoners I am holding as cannot afford a guard. 0615”.
Orders were immediately despatched to “C” and “D” Companies to work inwards and connect with “A” Company. These messages subsequently proved futile as both Companies had ceased to exist as tactical units.
At 8.57 a.m. a report timed 7.15 a.m. was received from “A” Company that he had gained touch with 49th Battalion on his right and that enemy were preparing to counter attack on his left. This information was sent on to Brigade and Artillery support obtained.
The position of Companies was obscure, as no reports had had been received from any Company other than “A”. A message was despatched to “A” Company at 9.22 a.m. asking point where his left rested and whether he was in touch with “C” Company.
At 9.49 a.m. a message timed 7.25 a.m. was received from “B” Company that two of his platoons were in MOQUET FARM and two platoons at, and mostly to the right of 42, but he was not certain whether 42 was actualy held.
It was not yet known that “C” Company was to all intents and purposes out of consideration, and it appeared that there was a gap between “A” and “C” Companies and probably between “C” and “B” companies. The exact position of “D” Company was also obscure.
At 12.3 noon a message timed 10.59 a.m. was received from”A” Company accompanied with a sketch which showed that the 49th Battalion were apparently at 36 and that trench 36 – 03 was unoccupied by us and apparently unoccupied by anybody.
Also it was clear that his left was not connected up. The situation of “D” Company was also perplexing, as the envelope of my message (D 90) was marked “Opened by me – “D” Company in our section” and initialled by Lieut. D.S. MAXWELL. He also gave the information that he and Lieut Blakney were the only 52nd Officers in that part of the trench. The questioning of messengers elicited the fact that very few of “D” Coy” were in the trench. A message was despatched to “A” Company endeavouring to clear this matter up.
About 1 o’clock the runner sent to “C” Company at 8.5 a.m. returned with the report that he could find nothing of “C” Company and that the Hostile Barrage prevented him approaching line 42-73. About mid day I was informed by the 51st Battn. That only about 30 men of the 52nd could be seen in the vicinity of point 42. Later in the afternoon 10 men from “B” Company reported at Battalion Headquarters and stated that they had come from somewhere near point 42 and had not seen any others of “B” Company by them.
The question of carriers for supplies had become acute, the parties detailled by Companies not being able to cope with the demand. The two bomb teams held in reserve were ordered to keep up the supply of bombs and fill vacancies in teams as required.
At 2.25 p.m. on their return from the Front Line, what remained of these teams were despatched to “A” Company for the purpose of occupying trench 03-36 and a message accompanied with a sketch sent to “A” Company that this trench be made good. The bombers arrived at “A” Company but the runner failed to deliver his despatch. At 3.30 p.m. Nos. 1 and 2 companies of the 13th canadian Battalion were placed under my command. No. 1 Company was directedto reinforce “A” Company, moving by SUNKEN ROAD 21-22-24.
The Battalion Intelligence Officer personnaly directed them to point 21 and the company reinforced the firing line at daylight with only 2 casualties. No. 2 Company was directed to occupy Line 21-01-91-59 and obtain touch with 50th Battalion on the left. The Battalion Intelligence Officer directed this company along its frontage and pointed out Communications Trenches 01-03 and 91-73. Orders were given for No. 2 Canadian Company to bomb up trench 91-73 put in a stop and place a Lewis Gun to protect Left Flank from direction of 49 and MOQUET FARM.
At 5.55 p.m. on Orders received from Brigade instructions were issued to No 1, Canadian Company to bomb to point 42 and along Communications Trenches running NORTH from 73 and 42 placeing stops in these later. This company reported that they eventually gained 73 and had put a stop about 60 yards down trench towards 01. Subsequent definitions of frontage, however, leads to the belief that it wa at 28-04 where they were held up and put up a barricade and possibly a stop was put on Trench 03-01.
…The next paragraph of the War Diary Appendix refers to 3.35 pm on the 4th and goes on to describe further action by the Canadian Reinforcements.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Bushfire in May
The
Adelaide Hills burning in May.
Only two weeks to winter and we still can have a bushfire. This coming summer will be bad I think.
Only two weeks to winter and we still can have a bushfire. This coming summer will be bad I think.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
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